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'Note

Juvenile Court Reform:
The Juvenile Offender
After L.B. 620
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the common law juvenile and adult offenders were tried

in the same courts, receiving similar sentences for similar acts.'
Society's perception of the problems created by the juvenile offender changed, however, and so did its court system. The first
juvenile court in the United States was established in 1899; within
in each
a few years, laws relating to juvenile offenders were passed
3
of the states.2 Nebraska's juvenile court dates from 1905.
. As with many other juvenile court systems, Nebraska's lacked
standards to prevent arbitrary and inflexible treatment of juvenile
offenders. Since the state's district and county courts shared concurrent jurisdiction over cases involving juvenile offenders, 4 a juvenile could be prosecuted in either court at the discretion of the
county attorney. There were substantial quantitative and qualitative differences between a juvenile proceeding in a county court
and an adult proceeding in either county or district court. Court
procedures varied from an informal proceeding to a formal criminal
trial. Further, sentences meted out by these two judicial systems
vary greatly. For example, the harshest sentence a juvenile court
can hand down is confinement in a Youth Development Center until
the juvenile reaches the age of 20 years. 5 Another difference is
the consequences of a finding of guilty in the two proceedings.
A county court conviction places a number of civil disabilities on
the criminal defendant and he acquires a permanent criminal
record; however, a finding of guilty in a juvenile court is not considered a "conviction" and does not carry with it the civil disabilities
1. See S. Ruxin, CRn mm N Juvziz

A RATIONAL APDELNQuENcy:
(2d ed. 1961).
Cohill, The United States Supreme Court and the Juvenile Courts, 9
DUQUESNE L. REV. 573 (1971).
Ch. 59, §§ 2, 3 [1905] Neb. Laws 29th Sess. at 306-07.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-202 (Reissue 1974).
NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-210.02 (Reissue 1974).
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attached to a criminal conviction. Also, there are provisions to protect the juvenile's record after a finding of guilty.6 There existed
no mandatory criteria for selecting the court in which a criminal
action against a juvenile offender would be brought. This arbitrary
system had been unsuccessfully attacked on a number of occasions
as violating the juveniles' rights to due process of law.7 In a very
real sense, the juvenile offender was at the mercy of the prosecuting
attorney.
The Nebraska Legislature recently examined the problem of
broad prosecutorial discretion in handling juvenile offenders. The
product of this extensive examination is L.B. 620.8 One of the
bill's primary purposes is "Et] o remove children who are within
the provisions of this act from the criminal justice system whenever
possible .... ,9 The bill's effect has been to limit dramatically the
county attorney's discretion when choosing the forum in which to
prosecute the juvenile offender.
II.

FORMER NEBRASKA STATUTES

Before passage of L.B. 620, county attorneys had complete discretion in choosing the forum in which to prosecute juvenile offenders. Charges could be brought in either juvenile or adult
court.1 0 A fifteen-year-old boy could be subjected to the same procedure and sentencing requirement as an adult offender who had
committed a like crime.
The recent Nebraska Supreme Court case of State v. Grayer,"1
illustrates the harsh and often inequitable consequences of the
traditional system.' 2 Fifteen year old Luigi Grayer received a sentence of life imprisonment-pursuant to a plea bargain-after his
conviction for first degree murder during the commission of a
robbery. On appeal Grayer alleged four counts of error: (1) that
NEB.REv. STAT. § 43-206.03 (5) (Reissue 1974).
7. A number of Nebraska Supreme Court cases have addressed this issue.
In the most recent, State v. Grayer, 191 Neb. 523, 215 N.W.2d 859
(1974), the court held that a prosecuting attorney's determination that
a 14-year-old juvenile who was accused of committing a felony was
to be prosecuted as an adult in criminal court, rather than as a juvenile in juvenile court, was not a violation of the juvenile's right to due
process of law under either the United States or Nebraska Constitution.
. Neb. Laws, 83d Leg. 2d Sess., 1974. This bill amended 14 separate statutes. To avoid confusion it has been cited throughout the Note as
"L.B. 620".
9. Id.
10. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-202 (Reissue 1974).
11. 191 Neb. 523, 215 N.W.2d 859 (1974).
12. Id. at 527-32, 215 N.W.2d at 861-64.

6.

JUVENILES
the county attorney's discretionary authority to file charges in
either the juvenile or criminal courts violated his right to due
process of law guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution; (2) that the lack of legislative guidelines for the exercise of such discretion violated Article 2, section
1, of Nebraska's Constitution; (3) that there had been committed an
abuse of discretion in failing to investigate his background; and (4)
that a defendant under sixteen years of age must be proceeded
against in a juvenile court.' 3 After considering Grayer's arguments,
the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court judgment.
By this affirmation the supreme court once again upheld the
prosecutor's discretionary power to decide in which forum a juvenile will be prosecuted. 14 Justice McCown's vigorous dissent
leveled a strong attack on the entire opinion. Stating that "[s] tatutes permitting and sanctioning such arbitrary action in the case
of juvenile offenders violate the principles of equal protection, as
well as due process of law, under both the federal and state constitutions."'15 Judge McCowan dwelt at length on the problems created
by vesting complete discretion in county prosecutors.
It may be noted that the court has repeatedly reaffirmed the
fundamental principle of our judicial system that individual rights
are to be determined by the law itself, not by its administrators.
Judge McCown argued that juveniles' rights should be determined
,bythe same constitutional standards as are applied to adults.'" He
also noted that a statute giving absolute, unregulated and undefined
discretion to an administrative officer bestows arbitrary authority
which is an unlawful delegation of legislative power in violation
of Article 2, section I and Article 3, section 1 of the Nebraska Constitution.' 7 The presumption that an officer will not act arbitrarily
13. Id. at 524, 215 N.W.2d at 860.
14. See Fugate v. Ronin, 167 Neb. 70, 91 N.W.2d 240 (1958). In a case
involving a 14-year-old girl convicted of a felony the court held:
A careful study of the [Juvenile Court Act] clearly indicates
it is not intended the juvenile court shall have exclusive jurisdiction and control of all juveniles.... Juvenile courts do
not have the sole or exclusive jurisdiction of children under
eighteen years of age who have violated our laws.
Id. at 75, 91 N.W.2d at 243-44. See also Kennedy v. Sigler, 397 F.2d
556 (8th Cir. 1968).
15. 191 Neb. 523, 529-30, 215 N.W.2d 859, 862-63 (1974) (McCown, J., dissenting). See also Green, The Disposition of Juvenile Offenders, 13
CRnm. L.Q. 348 (1971).
16. Id. at 530, 215 N.W.2d at 863. See also Rosett, Discretion, Severity,
and Legality in CriminalJustice, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 12 (1972).
17. Id. at 532, 215 N.W.2d at 864. See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972) for a discussion of the use and abuse of prosecutorial discretion.
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cannot sustain this delegation of unregulated discretion.18
Judge McCown addressed himself primarily to the problem of
the lack of criteria governing the waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction by the prosecutor. The United States Supreme Court considered this issue in Kent v. United States,19 in which a sixteenyear-old boy was accused of housebreaking, robbery and rape. The
District of Columbia Juvenile Court entered an order waiving its
exclusive jurisdiction and authorized Kent to be criminally prosecuted in the District Court for the District of Columbia. Although
the order stated that it was based on "full investigation," the court
failed to grant or rule on motions by Kent's attorney that a hearing
be held to consider whether the juvenile court should waive or retain jurisdiction over the case. Moreover, the order stated no
reason for granting the waiver and made no reference to the motions filed by Kent's attorney. Subsequently, Kent was indicted
in district court, and found guilty on a number of the counts and
was sentenced to 30 to 90 years in prison. The conviction was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit.20

On certiorari, the United States Supreme

Court reversed and remanded the case to the district court for a
hearing de novo on the issue of waiver.
In holding that it is incumbent upon the juvenile court to accompany its waiver order with a statement of reasons or considerations, the Court stated:
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the statute contemplates
that the Juvenile Court should have considerable latitude within
which to determine whether it should retain jurisdiction over a
child or-subject to the statutory delimitation-should waive jurisdiction. But this latitude is not complete. At the outset, it assumes
procedural regularity sufficient in the particular circumstances to
satisfy the basic requirements of due process and fairness, as well
as compliance with the statutory requirement of a "full investigaThe statute gives the Juvenile Court a substantial detion ......
gree of discretion as to the factual considerations to be evaluated,
the weight to be given them and the conclusion to be reached. It
does not confer upon the Juvenile Court a license for arbitrary procedure. The statute does not permit the Juvenile Court to determine in isolation and without the participation or any representation of the child the "critically important" question whether a child
will be deprived of the special protections and provisions of the
Juvenile Court Act. It does not authorize the Juvenile Court, in
total disregard of a motion for hearing filed by counsel, and without any hearing or statement or reasons, to decide-as in this casethat the child will be taken from the Receiving Home for Children
18. Id. at 530-31, 215 N.W.2d at 863.
19. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
20. Kent v. United States, 343 F.2d 247 (D.C. Cir. 1965).

JUVENILES
and transferred to jail along with adults, and that he will be exposed to the possibility of a death sentence instead of treatment
for a maximum, in Kent's case, of five years, until he is 21.21
The Court's holding in Kent appears to mandate the establishment and implementation of specific standards before criminal
action is initiated against a juvenile in criminal court. Before
L.B. 620 such standards existed in Nebraska's statutory scheme.
Thus Judge McCown argued, the majority holding in Grayer sanctioned an unconstitutional denial of the benefits of Nebraska's Ju22
venile Court Act to any juvenile offender.
After reading Nebrask's Juvenile Court Act and the majority
opinion in the Grayer case one might agree with Judge McCown
that before L.B. 620 there were two standards of due process and
equal protection applied in Nebraska-one for juveniles and another
for adults. This double constitutional standard appears to be inconsistent with the United States Supreme Court's holding in In re
Gault.23 In that case the Court held that juvenile offenders were
guaranteed (1) adequate and timely notice of the proceedings and
charges against them, (2) legal counsel (including free legal counsel
if the family could not afford counsel), (3) the privilege against
self-incrimination, and (4) the right to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses. When these guarantees are meted out at the
discretion of prosecutors, the probability of harmful discrimination
increases. Since the idea behind the establishment of the juvenile
court system is to treat yoUthful offenders relative to their age and
experience, it seems inconsistent to allow prosecutors to undermine
it at their discretion by proceeding against a juvenile in adult court.
The Grayer case is a classic example of the problem;2 had Grayer
21. 383 U.S. at 552 (1966). The statutes mentioned by the Court are D.C.
CODE §§ 11-1551 and 1553 (Supp. IV, 1965).
22. 191 Neb. 523, 532, 215 N.W.2d 859, 864 (1974).
23. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The Supreme Court has dealt extensively with the
problems surrounding the due process rights of juveniles in more recent cases. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) and
De Backer v. Brainard, 396 U.S. 28 (1969).
24. The majority opinion in Grayer was based on cases that interpreted
Kent to be merely a statutory decision. See United States v. Bland,
472 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d 334 (4th
Cir. 1973). Both cases dealt with similar discretion vested in the Attorney General of the United States under federal statutes. Both cases
held "Congress could reasonably vest in Attorney General, rather than
in a judge in a judicial proceeding, the responsibility of deciding
whether or not to prosecute a juvenile as an adult." The Bland case
specifically states that such discretion does not violate due process.
472 F.2d at 1335-36.
The majority in Grayer extended this argument to Nebraska's statutory scheme.

410

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 54, NO. 2 (1975)

been proceeded against in juvenile court, he would not have received life imprisonment. At most he would have been incarcerated
in the boys' reformatory until the age of twenty. L.B. 620, by providing mandatory standards for prosecutors, may help solve the
problem of double -constitutional standards.
HI.

L.B. 620: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

One of the most difficult problems faced by judges and attorneys
in litigating a case is ascertaining the legislative intent underlying
statutes. This task has been facilitated for parties interpreting
L.B. 620. In both the committee discussions and the floor debates,
all the issues were openly and frankly discussed. Therefore, a brief
discussion of L.B. 620's legislative history will flesh out the meaning and purpose of this important legislation.
L.B. 620, presented by Senator Barnett, was the result of the
research and recommendations made 'by members of the Nebraska
Committee for Children and Youth who were members of the Juvenile Court Study Committee. 25 According to Senator Barnett,
the law's basic purpose is to correct problems stemming from prosecutorial discretion in determining in which court a juvenile offender
would be tried. Prior to passage of this law, juveniles were given
only one opportunity-and that was before the county attorneyfor a determination of the court in which they would be tried. 26
The laws of this state permit the prosecuting attorney to determine whether a felon of tender age shall be prosecuted in
the juvenile court or in the district court as an ordinary offender. This discretion so vested in the prosecuting attorney
is akin to that permitting him to determine whether or not to
prosecute, what charge should be made and whether or not
to dismiss, apply for immunity, or accept a plea to a lesser
offense. All these matters represent necessary and essential
decisions of an administrative character which of necessity are
determined under varying factual circumstances. To fix reasonable legislative standards for the determination of such

matters would be difficult and probably impossible due to the
multiplicity of factual circumstances.
191 Neb. at 526, 215 N.W.2d at 861. However, if one reads Kent and
Gault together it is questionable whether the court intended to limit

its opinions to narrow statutory interpretation.

25. Hearings on L.B. 620 Before the Judiciary Comm., 83d Neb. Leg. Sess.,
at 2 (1974).
26. Hearings,supra note 25, at 1. See also NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 42-202 and

43-208 (Reissue 1974). Some jurisdictions, recognizing the vital importance of the transfer decision, have held the decision directly appealable. See State v. Briggs, 245 Ore. 503, 420 P.2d 71 (1966); State
v. Yoss, 10 Ohio App. 2d 47, 225 N.E.2d 275 (1967); In re Houston, 221

Tenn. 528, 428 S.W.2d 303 (1968). See also Note, Review of Improper
Juvenile Transfer Hearings,60 VA. L. REv. 818 (1974).
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The county attorney's decision was final.27 There were no mandatory criteria for him to follow in making his determination. In Senator Barnett's words:
[T~he idea is to give the juvenile a little better break... the same
break that we give adults in that, what it sets up... is for the
county attorney [to] still decide the initial court that a juvenile
should be tried in. Except, in this bill he has the criteria that he
shall follow ... Now, in the second part of the bill, the juvenile
then has the right to appeal. He can appeal this case to the judge
that is to hear it. When he appeals this case the judge will then
hear and set down through his criteria ... if he thinks the county
attorney
is right, or if the juvenile may be tried in a different
court. 28
Finally, Senator Barnett voiced a concern with subjecting juveniles
to the harshness of our penal system. He stated that placing juveniles under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court system increased
the possibility of rehabilitation.2 9 This theme of concern over flexibility runs throughout the law which tries to remove the juvenile
from the jurisdiction of the criminal court system-and, wherever
possible place him or her under the control of the juvenile court
system.
The law evoked considerable public response during the hearings. Provisions of particular interest were the limits placed on
the county attorney's discretion in choosing the forum in which to
proceed against juveniles,3 0 the law's transfer provisions, 31 rules
concerning filing of charges,3 2 and the criteria that must be considered by the county attorney before filing charges. 33
Most of the discussion centered around the criteria that the
county attorney must consider before filing charges. One speaker
asked whether they could pass the equal protection requirements
as outlined in the Kent case.3 4 To guarantee the juvenile's right
27. Transcript of Debate on L.B. 620, 83d Neb. Leg. Seas., at 5771-72
(1974).
28. Id. at 5771.
29. Id. at 5771-72. See Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure, or A
Third Model of the Criminal Process, 79 YALE L.J. 359 (1970). The
author discusses a number of "model" criminal justice systems. His
discussion of the Family Model is particularly relevant in considering
our juvenile court system and its uses.
30. Id. at 4-5. See also L.B. 620 § 4 (1974).
31. Hearings,supra note 25, at 5-6. See also note 57, infra.
32. Hearings,supra note 25, at 6-9.
33. Id. at 8.
34. Id. at 8-9; see also Kent, supra note 14 for a discussion of the equal
protection requirements for the transfer and waiver of jurisdiction in
juvenile cases; see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). For the court's
analysis of these problems on a state level see People v. Fields, 391
Mich. 206, 216 N.W.2d 51 (1974).

412

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 54, NO. 2 (1975)

to equal protection, a judge or county attorney should be able to
determine from reading the law which court the juvenile must be
tried in. As will be discussed below,3 5 however, these criteria are
amenable to various interpretations; their scope may be broadened
or narrowed at the discretion of each judge. Thus, whether the
law will in fact withstand a constitutional attack on equal protection grounds is open to question at this time.
At the public hearings, concern was also voiced over the provisions dealing with waivers of jurisdiction 3 8-specifically, due
process problems in relation to the Kent case.3 7 One proposal was
to proceed against juveniles in criminal court.3 8 If found guilty, the
defendant could be sentenced under either the juvenile or criminal
statutes. However, Kent and In re Gault suggest that this proposal
would create more problems than it would solve.39 Though undoubtedly more efficient, the juvenile's right to due process might
be jeopardized under such a system. Once a juvenile had been convicted in a criminal court, who would have the power to decide
which statutes would apply in sentencing him? What factors would
be considered in making this decision? What restraints, if any,
would there be on the decision maker's use of discretion? Would
the juvenile have the right to appeal the decision, and if so, on
what ground? All of these are valid and grave constitutional questions. Our judicial system, of course, needs flexibility to provide
alternatives in dealing with juvenile offenders. However, the procedures used to implement these alternatives must be based on a
firm constitutional foundation.
Finally, there were comments made by those who opposed virtually the entire bill.40 One particular point of contention was the
limitations that would be placed on prosecutors. It was argued that
although the law might limit the prosecutor's discretion in choosing
the forum, it would still allow the decision to be made by a single
individual-the judge. While superficially true, this criticism does
not tell the entire story. Prior to the passage of L.B. 620, a juvenile
could not appeal the prosecutor's decision concerning the forum.
Under the new system, however, the decision is scrutinized by two
officials. The prosecutor still makes the initial decision, but the
See notes 51-55 and accompanying text infra.
See note 57 infra.
See note 34, supra.
Hearings, supra note 25, at 16-21. See also In re F.R.W., 61 Wis. 2d
193, 212 N.W.2d 130 (1973); In re Jackson, 46 Mich. App. 764, 208
N.W.2d 526 (1973).
39. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553-61 (1966); In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 3-34 (1967).
40. Hearings,supra note 25, at 21-8.

35.
36.
37.
38.
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judge can accept or reject it. Further, though the judge's decision
cannot be directly appealed, it is reviewable on appeal after the
trial. Finally, it might be noted that the prosecutor and the judge
play different roles in our system. Where the prosecutor cannot
be neutral because of his role, the judge has a duty to be as objective as possible in exercising his power. It can be argued that, in
the interests of justice, it is better to have a neutral decisionmaker
rule on vital questions such as jurisdiction and venue.
After lengthy debate on the various provisions of L.B. 620, it
was passed in April, 1974. The legislation has dramatically effected
the entire scope of our judicial system.
IV. THE JUVENILE OFFENDER AFTER L.B. 620
With the passage of L.B. 620, the pre-adjudication status of the
juvenile offender drastically changed. Previously a juvenile was
at the mercy of the county attorney's choice of forum, but now
there are important guidelines that must be used in making this
choice.
Section-I of the bill amended the section of the Nebraska Juvenile Court Act that defined the classes of juveniles dealt with
in the act,4 1 substituting new definitions for the categories covered. 42 The section states that the juveniles now covered are those
defined in sections 3 and 4 of the bill. Section 3, the most relevant
portion of the bill dealing with these classes, emphasizes age, social
situation and type of offense with which the juvenile is charged
in its classifications. This section uses precise categories and language in defining the limits of each class.43 The new law changed
41. NE. REv. STAT. § 43-201 (Reissue 1974).
42. The old classes consisted of (1) dependent children; (2) neglected

children; (3) delinquent children; (4) children in need of special su-

pervision. Though the legislative history of this bill is silent as to why
these classes were redefined, it is possible that the legislature desired
to abolish the former classes due to their stigmatizing effect. For example, consider the stigma of being, statutorily classified as a "delinquent" or "neglected" child.
43.
The county court in each county except as provided in subdivisions (3) (b) and (3) (c) of this section, shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction except in counties which have established
a separate juvenile court as to the following:
(1) Any child under the age of eighteen years, who is
homeless or destitute, or without proper support through no

fault of his parent, guardian, or custodian;

(2) Any child under the age of eighteen years (a) who is
abandoned by his parent, guardian, or custodian; (b) who
lacks proper parental care by reason of the fault or habits of
his parent, guardian, or custodian; (c) whose parent, guardian, or custodian neglects, is unable, or refuses to provide
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section 42-202 by omitting the old labels of (1) dependent children;
(2) neglected children; (3) delinquent children; and (4) children
in need of special supervision. Though the legislative history gives
no reason for this change, it is possible that the legislature desired
to abolish the former classes because of their stigmatizing effect.
For example, consider the stigma of being statutorily classified as
a "delinquent" or a "neglected child."
The specificity in the new definitions may be significant in the
law's application. For example, section (2) (d) which covers mentally retarded children who are neglected, even though not rewritten, could have a strong impact on the protection of the rights
of mentally retarded juvenile defendants when read in conjunction
with those sections which have been changed.
Finally, section 1 adds a new subsection to the statute. It states
that parties referred to in the Nebraska Juvenile Court Act are
those specified in the amended section 43-202. The term "parties"
now includes the juvenile or child as described in section 3 of L.B.
620, parents, guardians and custodians of the child.
proper or necessary subsistence, education, or other care
necessary for the health, morals, or well-being of such child;
(d) whose parent, guardian, or custodian neglects or refuses to
provide special care made necessary by the mental condition
of the child; or (e) who is in a situation or engages in an occupation dangerous to life or limb or injurious to the health or
morals of such child;

(3) (a) Any child under the age of sixteen years at the
time he has violated any law of the state which would constitute a misdemeanor or traffic infraction if committed by a
person eighteen years of age or over or any city or village ordinance amounting to a misdemeanor, or providing as a penalty any fine or jail sentence if committed by a person eighteen years of age or more, except parking violations; (b) concurrent jurisdiction with the district court as to any child under the age of eighteen years at the time he has violated any
law of the state constituting a felony; and (c) concurrent jurisdiction with the county or municipal court as to any child
sixteen or seventeen years of age at the time he has (i) violated a state law constituting a misdemeanor, (ii) committed
a traffic infraction, or (iii) violated any city or village ordinance providing as a penalty a fine or jail sentence, except
parking violations;
(4) Any child under the age of eighteen years (a) who,
by reason of being wayward or habitually disobedient, is uncontrolled by his parent, guardian, or custodian; (b) who is
habitually truant from school or home; or (c) who deports
himself so as to injure or endanger seriously the morals or
health of himself or others;
(5) The parent, guardian, or custodian who has custody of
any such child described in this section; and
(6) Proceedings for termination of parental rights as provided in this act.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-202 (Cum. Supp. 1974).

JUVENILES
As pointed out above, one of the most perlexing problems confronting judges and attorneys when they attempt to interpret a
particular statute, is the search for the legislative intent. Section
43-201.01 makes this task relatively simple. In acknowledging the
juvenile courts' responsibility to "preserve the public peace and
security," the legislators have expressed five specific purposes
Acknowledging the responsibility of the juvenile court to act to
preserve the public peace and security, this act shall be construed

to effectuate the following:
(1) To assure the rights of all children to care and protection
and to development of their capacities for a healthy personality,

physical well-being and useful citizenship and to protect the public
interest;
(2) To provide for the intervention of the juvenile court in
the interest of any child who is within the provisions of this act,
with due regard to parental rights and capacities and the availability of nonjudicial resources;
(3) To remove children who are within the provisions of this
act from the criminal justice system whenever possible and to reduce the possibility of their committing future law violations
through the provision of social and rehabilitative services to such
children and their families;
(4) To achieve the foregoing purposes in the child's own
home whenever possible, separating the child from his parents only
when necessary for his welfare or in the interest of public safety
and, when temporary separation is necessary, to consider the
developmental needs of the individual child in all placements and
to assure every reasonable effort possible to reunite the child with
his family; and
(5) To provide a simple judicial procedure through which
these purposes and goals are accomplished and enforced and in
which the parties are assured a fair hearing and44their constitutional
and other legal rights recognized and enforced.
The legislative intent reflects a concern for the juvenile offender
as a social being-not merely as a legal problem. With heavy emphasis on alternatives to the often narrow judicial process, this section provides a more flexibile approach to the solution of the many

complex problems surrounding the juvenile offender.
Sections 3 and 4 thus might be called the "heart" of L.B. 620.
Section 3 amended section 43-202 relating to state court jurisdiction
over juvenile cases. During the debate and committee discussions,

there was strong opposition to a number of subsections of section

3-especially subsection 3(a) 45 involving children who are under
the age of sixteen at the time a state or municipal law or ordinance
is violated which would be a misdemeanor if committed by an adult.
44. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-201.01 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
45. Hearings, supra note 25, at 21-22.

416

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 54, NO. 2 (1975)

The opposition pointed out that there are no city ordinances that
are misdemeanors if violated, implying that the subsection was unnecessary. Though there may be no municipal ordinances amounting to misdemeanors if violated, those who opposed this language
apparently did not consider, or overlooked, the language specifically
including any state law amounting to a misdemeanor. 46 This is an
important distinction because there are state traffic violations that
47
amount to misdemeanors and carry a penalty of imprisonment.
These are offenses that are not uncommon to the age group covered
by subsection 3(a). If this language had not been included, one
purpose of the bill-taking juveniles out of the criminal court system-would have been greatly weakened.
Some of the strongest opposition to the bill surfaced in relation
to subsections 3(b) and 3(c). 4 s These subsections give county
courts concurrent jurisdiction-except in counties with separate juvenile courts-with the district courts over children between the
ages of sixteen to eighteen who have committed certain offenses.
Those opposing these subsections4 9 believed they would undermine
the authority of the police to make arrests and thought county attorneys should have complete control over the disposition of these
juveniles. The opponents suggested that these subsections be deleted. Had this been done, the bill would have been significantly
weakened. It must be remembered that one of the primary purposes
of this legislation is to create a more flexible scope of jurisdiction
46. The subsection reads as follows:
(3) (a) Any child under the age of sixteen years at the
time he has violated any law of the state which would constitute a misdemeanor or traffic infraction if committed by a
person eighteen years of age or over or any city or village ordinance amounting to a misdemeanor, or providing as a penalty any fine or jail sentence if committed by a person eighteen years of age or more, except parking violations.
47. See NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 39-669.02 (Reissue 1974) (reckless drivingpunishable by a fine and/or imprisonment for not less than five days
nor more than thirty); 39-669.07 (Reissue 1974) (drunken drivingfirst offense-punishable by a fine and/or imprisonment for not more
than three months.
48. The subsections read as follows:
(b) concurrent jurisdiction with the district court as to any
child under the age of eighteen years at the time he has violated any law of the state constituting a felony; and (c) concurrent jurisdiction with the county or municipal court as to
any child sixteen or seventeen years of age at the time he has
(i) violated a state law constituting a misdemeanor, (ii) committed a traffic infraction, or (iii) violated any city or village
ordinance providing as a penalty a fine or jail sentence, ex.cept parking violations.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-202(3) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
49. Hearings,supra note 25, at 22-7,
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within which a juvenile may be prosecuted;5 0 the only effective
means to accomplish this is through the creation of concurrent
jurisdiction.
The most vehement criticism was directed at section 43-202.01.5 1
This section was designed to limit the discretionary power of prosecutors to file criminal charges against juvenile offenders in county
or district court. It makes it mandatory that the county prosecutor,
when deciding whether to file a criminal charge or a juvenile court
petition, consider, among other things, the eight criteria in this section:
(1) The type of treatment such minor would most likely be amenable to; (2) whether there is evidence that the alleged offense included violence or was committed in an aggressive and premeditated manner; (3) the motivation for the commission of the offense; (4) the age of the minor and the ages and circumstances
of any others involved in the offense; (5) the previous history of
the minor, including whether he had been convicted of any previous offenses or adjudicated in juvenile court and, if so, whether
such offenses were crimes against the person or relating to property, and any other previous history of antisocial behavior, if any,
including any patterns of physical violence; (6) the sophistication
and maturity of the child as determined by consideration of his
home, school activities, emotional attitude and desire to be treated
as an adult, pattern of living, and whether he has had previous contact with law enforcement agencies and courts and the nature
thereof; (7) whether there are facilities particularly available to
the juvenile court for the treatment and rehabilitation of the minor;
and (8) whether the best interest of the minor and the security
of the public may require that the minor continue in custody or
under supervision for a period extending beyond his minority and,
if so, the available alternatives best suited to this purpose.
The county attorney shall attach an affidavit with his complaint
or petition, as the case may be, setting forth his decision and that
he has considered such criteria. 52
The county attorney must also attach an affidavit to his complaint
(or petition) verifying that he has considered all the criteria in
making his decision. Nowhere in the law's legislative history or in
its text is there reference to the specific form or requirements this
affidavit must meet. It is not clear whether the affidavit must contain the reasoning underlying the county attorney's decision or
whether merely swearing that he considered the standards is sufficient. Considering the implications of this latter requirement-if it
is one-one can be certain that this question will be litigated in
the future.
50. Transcript, supra, note 22, at 5771-72. See also Note, Prosecutorial
Discretion and the Decision to Waive Juvenile Court-Jurisdiction,1973
WAsH. U.L.Q. 436.

51. See note 49 supra.
52. NEE. Rnv. STAT. § 43-202.01 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
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Section 43-202.01 directly reflects the philosophy underlying
L.B. 620. 53 These standards will help to ensure a rational basis
for a prosecutor's decision as to which court will hear the case.
They incorporate flexibility into the court system, allow a wide
variety of alternatives to be considered, and emphasize rehabilitation rather than punitive sanctions. One example of the differences may be found in the case of a juvenile misdemeanant who
is mildly mentally retarded. Before L.B. 620 his mental condition
might have been overlooked by the county attorney in deciding
which court would handle the case. Under section 43-202.01(6),
however, the county attorney must consider this condition in making his decision. Under various provisions of this bill54 it is likely
that the court would prescribe some form of therapy or treatment
rather than punish the individual. This, in turn, would take the
juvenile out of the criminal justice system and place him in a 'situation where his best interests, as well as society's, would be served.
This example can be expanded to include juveniles with physical,
emotional, or social problems and still not exhaust the possibilities
under section 43-202.01. The effect of this approach will be to encourage the administration of justice on an individualized basis.
Though section 43-202.01 has created an atmosphere for injecting
more rationality and justice into the juvenile court system, it also
may create a number of problems. One of these concerns the broad,
and sometimes vague, language used within the statute. For example, the prosecutor must consider the juvenile's "pattern of living" 55 in making his determination. What does this mean? If the
juvenile is a member of a family living in dire poverty, must this
be considered? What about the son or daughter of "hippie"
parents? Who defines the scope of this "pattern"? These are difficult questions, but they must be asked. Another possible problem
is equal protection. Will the language of this section be interpreted
to treat similarly situated juveniles alike? Will greater weight be
placed on one criterion than another? Is a uniform standard of
interpretation and implementation for these criteria possible?
53. See note 27, supra.
54. One can find these provisions in a number of sections of the bill For
example, § 43-202(2) (d) speaks of children who need "special care
made necessary by ... (his) mental condition." Also, § 43-202.01 (1)
states that the prosecutor must consider "[t] he type of treatment such
minor would most likely be amenable to... ." Considering these and
other provisions, it appears that the court might have power to make
such disposition of the juvenile as it deems necessary. This proposition is directly supported by the language of § 29-2204. See note 63,
infra.
55. See section 4(6).
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Again, these are difficult questions that the courts will have to answer eventually.
Section 43-202.02 is a completely new statute while section 6 of
L.B. 620 amends the current statute covering the arraignment of
juveniles and waiver of the court's jurisdiction. 56 These sections
should be read together because they overlap in terms of subject
matter.
Section 43-202.02 provides that, at any time prior to trial or entering a plea, a juvenile sixteen or seventeen years of age at the
time he committed the offense may petition the municipal or county
court to waive jurisdiction to the juvenile court for further proceedings. 57 In deciding the motion, the court must consider the
standards found in 43-202.01. If the court decides to retain jurisdiction, the juvenile may appeal this decision after trial.58 This allows
an accused juvenile a "second chance" at getting into a juvenile
court.59

As noted, 29-1816 also involves waiver of jurisdiction. 60 The pro56. NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-1816 (Reissue 1964).
At any time before trial or entering a plea, a child sixteen
57.

or seventeen years of age at the time of the commission of the

alleged act charged in municipal court or in county court not
sitting as a juvenile court may move the court in which the
charge is pending to waive jurisdiction to the juvenile court
for further proceedings under Chapter 43, article 2. In deciding the motion the court shall consider among other matters,
the matters required to be considered by the county attorney
pursuant to section 4 of this act when determining the type

of case to file.
The court shall set forth findings for the reason for its decision, which shall not be a final order for the purpose of en-

abling an appeal. If the court determines that the child
should be transferred to the juvenile court, the complete file
in the court shall be transferred to the juvenile court and the
complaint may be used in place of a petition therein. The
court making a transfer shall order the minor to be taken
forthwith to the juvenile court and designate where the minor
shall be kept pending determination by the juvenile court.

The juvenile court shall then proceed as provided in Chapter
43, article 2.

NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-202.01 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
58. See note 26 supra. It is questionable whether review of the judge's
decision after the trial is an adequate remedy. It might be better to

amend this section so as to make the judge's decision final for the pur-

pose of an appeal. This would extend to the juvenile the advantage
of having the decision reviewed in relation to the provisions of section
4 and would promote judicial economy in terms of re-adjudicating
cases.
59. See Resteiner, "Delinquent or Criminal: Problems of Transfers of Jurisdiction,"JUVENILE JusTicE, May, 1973, at 2.
The accused shall be arraigned by reading to him the in60.
dictment or information, unless the reading shall be waived
by the accused where the nature of the charge is made known
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visions are the same as the old statute6'1 except that the section
now provides for a motion to have the district court waive its jurisdiction to the county court at the time of the arraignment or at
any time not less than fifteen days before trial. Since many county
courts sit as juvenile courts, this gives the juvenile another chance
to have his case heard before a juvenile court. It also must be
noted that the district court's decision is reviewable on appeal. The
other significant change in this section is the language stating that
the accused may be arraigned by "information" as well as by indictment. Arraignment by information would allow the juvenile to
forego the stigma of being indicted. This is important when one
considers the future effects of a criminal record. 62
Section 29-2204(2), dealing with sentencing, may be one of the
most important changes made 'by L.B. 620.63 The statute now
to him, and he shall then be asked whether he is guilty or
not guilty of the offense charged. If the accused appears in
person and by counsel and goes to trial before a jury regularly
impaneled and sworn, he shall be deemed to have waived arraignment and a plea of not gulty shall be deemed to have
been made.
At the time of the arraignment or at any time not later
than fifteen days before trial, the defendant, if he were less
than eighteen years of age at the time of the commitment of
the alleged crime, may move the district court to waive jurisdiction in such case to the county court or the separate juvenile court, as the case may be, for further proceedings under
Chapter 43, article 2. The court shall schedule a hearing on
such motion within fifteen days.
In deciding such motion the court shall consider, among
other matters, the matters set forth in section 4 of this act for
consideration by the county attorney when determining the
type of case to file.
The court shall set forth findings for the reason for its decision, which shall not be a final order for the purpose of enabling an appeal. If the court determines that the child should
be transferred to the juvenile court, the complete file in the
district court shall be transferred to the juvenile court and the
indictment or information may be used in place of a petition
therein. The court making a transfer shall order the minor
to be taken forthwith to the juvenile court and designate
where the minor shall be kept pending determination by the
juvenile court. The juvenile court shall then proceed as provided in Chapter 43, article 2.
NEB.REV. STAT. § 29-1816 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
61. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1816 (Reissue 1964).
62. See, Karabian, Record of Arrest: The Indelible Stain, 3 PAC. L.J. 20
(1962).
63.
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, in
all cases when any person shall be convicted of any offense
by this code declared criminal, and made punishable by imprisonment in the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex,
the court shall declare in its sentence for what period of time,
within the respective periods prescribed by law, such convict
shall be imprisoned at hard labor in the Nebraska Penal and
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provides that if a juvenile was under, eighteen years of age at
the time the crime was committed, the court may use its
discretion in imposing a sentence. The court, instead of imposing
the applicable sentence, may make such disposition of the juvenile
as the court deems proper under the circumstances. The standards
for making this ,determination are those set forth in the existing
applicable state statutes. 4 Though one might view this as a
grant of arbitrary discretionary power, a reading of the entire
bill belies this interpretation; section 29-2204(2) merely grants a
measure of flexibility to the court. In many cases the statutory
sentence may be too harsh and unrealistic relative to the particular
defendant. The statute gives the court the flexibility to fit the sentence to the crime, thus striking a balance between guilt and punishment.
The courts may require section 29-2204(2) to be implemented
using the standards set out in section 43-202.01. In this way the
courts could free themselves from the constraints imposed by the
inflexibility of the old statutes which did not consider social, economic and socio-psychological elements. Few alternatives were available in terms of sentencing. By using the standards outlined in
section 43-202.01, the courts can tailor the judicial process to the
individual case.
It should be noted that this proposal is open to an equal protection attack. It may be argued that sections 43-202.01 and 29-2204(2)
provide for inherently unequal administration of justice. This criticism, however, might be countered by pointing out that justice is
never "equal" in the sense that the same penalty given to every,
defendant committing the same crime provides an "equal" sanction
for the offense. Rather, "equal justice" is that justice dispensed
according to all the facts and circumstances unique to each defendant in each particular case. Therefore, if the intent of the legislature-as expressed in section 43-201.01-is to be fulfilled, the courts
Correctional Complex; and shall moreover determine and declare in its sentence whether any such convict shall be kept

in solitary confinement in the cells of the Nebraska Penal and
Correctional Complex, without labor, and if so, for what period of time.
(2) Whenever the defendant was under eighteen years of

age at the time he committed the crime for which he was con-

victed, the court may in its discretion, instead of imposing the
penalty provided for the crime, make such disposition of the
defendant as the court deems proper under the provisions of
Chapter 43, article 2, as to persons adjudicated in the juvenile
courts.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2204 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
64. NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-201 et seq. (Reissue 1974).
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must possess and use the discretion given them in these two
statutes.
Section 43-201 was amended to establish the procedure for instituting juvenile court proceedings. 5 It replaced the classes of juveniles covered by the old statute with those specified in section
43-202. In addition, it allows a city or village attorney to file a
petition in juvenile court when proceeding against any juvenile under eighteen who has allegedly violated a city or village ordinance
that would amount to a misdemeanor. Since the number of such
ordinances is relatively small in most Nebraska municipalities, the
effect of this on juvenile court proceedings is questionable.
The final significant change made by L.B. 620 was to grant the
juvenile the right to appeal a decision of a juvenile court or a
66
county court sitting as a juvenile court, to the district court.

If

the district court finds the juvenile to be a child as defined in sec65.

The county attorney or any reputable person residing in
the county, with the consent of the county attorney, having
knowledge of a child in the county who appears to be a child
as described in subdivision (1), (2), (3), or (4) of section 43202 may file with the clerk of the court having jurisdiction
in the matter, a petition in writing, setting forth the facts verified by affidavit. It shall be sufficient if the affidavit is upon
information and belief. Such petition and all subsequent proceedings shall be entitled In the Interest of
, a
Child Under Eighteen Years of Age, inserting the child's name
in the blank.
When any child under eighteen years of age is alleged to
have violated a city or village ordinance which if committed
by a person over eighteen would amount to a misdemeanor,
the city or village attorney may file a petition in the juvenile
court having jurisdiction as provided in subdivision (3) of
section 43-202.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-205 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
66.
When a juvenile court proceeding has been instituted before a county court sitting as a juvenile court, the original jurisdiction of the county court shall continue until the final
disposition thereof, and appeal may be had to the district
court as in civil cases, but no such appeal shall stay the enforcement of any order entered in the county court. After appeal has been filed, the district court, upon application and
hearing, may stay any order, judgment or decree on appeal
if suitable arrangement is made for care and custody of the
child. The county court shall continue to exercise supervision
over the child until a hearing is had in the district court and
the district court enters an order making other disposition. If
the district court adjudges the child to be a child defined in
section 43-201, the district court shall affirm the disposition
made by the county court, unless it is shown by clear and
convincing evidence that the disposition of the county court
is not in the best interest of such child. Upon determination

of the appeal, the district court shall remand the case to the
county court for further proceedings consistent with the determination of the district court.
NEB. Ray. STAT § 43-202.3 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
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tion 43-202, it shall affirm the disposition made by the county court
unless it is shown by "clear and convincing evidence" that the disposition is not in the best interest of the juvenile. If the latter
is found, the district court will remand the case to the juvenile
or county court for further proceedings.
The remaining ten sections of L.B. 620 merely amend the terminology of various pre-existing statutes. 61 Most of these amendments simply substitute the new classifications of juveniles for the
old ones to make them consistent with the other provisions of the
new law.68
V.

CONCLUSION

L.B. 620, as a whole, is a progressive step toward providing
justice and meaningful rehabilitation for the juvenile offender.
This note has analyzed the legislative history and contents of this
important legislation in an attempt to illustrate the relationship between each amended statute and its effect on various aspects of
the juvenile court system. It is apparent that L.B. 620 has significantly reduced the prosecutor's discretionary power, and gives the
court more flexibility in dealing with a broad category of juvenile
offenders in an individualized manner.
The law's future effectiveness lies in the courts' interpretive
hands. Its efficacy will rise or fall on their interpretations. One
may be confident that this legislation will encounter opposition.
The limitations it places on the prosecutors' discretion may prompt
them to attack it. The law may also be attacked on constitutional
grounds because of some procedural and substantive questions it
raises. These problems may seek solutions in the court room or
on the floor of the legislature. 69 However, no matter how changes
67. These sections amend individual state statutes as follows: Section 10
amends NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-206 (Supp. 1972); section 11 amends NEB.
REV. STAT. § 43-206.02 (Reissue 1974); section 12 amends NrB. REv.
STAT. § 43-206.03 (Supp. 1972); section 13 amends NEB. REV. STAT. §
43-208 (Supp. 1972); section 14 amends NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-209 (Reissue 1974); section 15 amends NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-210 (Supp. 1973);
section 16 amends NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-210.01 (Supp. 1973); section 17
amends NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-215 (Reissue 1974); and section 18 amends
NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-218 (Reissue 1974).
68. See sections 3 and 4 of L.B. 620.
69.
Four bills pertaining to the disposition of cases involving juvenile
offenders have been introduced that will significantly effect a number of the provisions of L.B. 620. The first of these is L.B. 288. At
the present time it has not been passed. It would have eliminated
the implementation of the rules of evidence at all hearings held to
decide the question of waiver of jurisdiction to either the juvenile or
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county court from the district court and would have added another

criterion to the eight listed in section 4 of L.B. 620. This ninth
criterion would allow the county attorney to consider "such other
matters as he deems relevant" in making his decision as to the forum
in which to prosecute the juvenile.

A second bill, L.B. 292, has been passed. It establishes a procedure
by which a detained juvenile offender will have the right to a "probable cause" hearing concerning the continuation of his detention. The
rules of evidence, however, will not apply to this proceeding. There
is no mention of what standards or criteria the county attorney will
have to follow in establishing "probable cause" to continue the
juvenile's detention.
The third bill, L.B. 293, codifies due process safeguards at the
hearing after the juvenile is in custody. The judge will be required
to advise the juvenile-whether he is represented by counsel or
not-that he has (1) the right to counsel; (2) the privilege against
self-incrimination; (3) the right to confront anyone who has accused
him and to cross-examine any witnesses who appear against him; and
(4) the right to call witnesses in his own behalf. After these rights
are explained, the court will then be able to accept an in-court admission by the juvenile (i.e., a plea of guilty) of all or part of the allegations made against him in the county attorney's petition or charge.
However, before accepting an admission the court is required to
determine whether it is being voluntarily and understandingly made.
L.B. 293 will greatly aid the protection of the juvenile offender's rights
to due process of law.
Finally, L.B. 293-involving custodial detention of juvenile offenders-allows city or county authorities to place a juvenile in a state
institution so that he or she can be examined by a physician, surgeon, psychiatrist or psychologist to determine the juvenile's mental
condition, competence to participate in the proceedings, or legal
responsibility for his acts. Placement in an adult penal institution is
prohibited. The maximum amount of time the juvenile can be committed is sixty days. All costs incurred during this period will be
absorbed by the state. Finally, the juvenile has the right to request a
hearing to file a motion for release. L.B. 294 could be a "doubleedged sword." On one hand, it could be used as an effective tool to
aid the juvenile, and ensure a just adjudication. On the other hand,
it could also be used to harass, degrade and intimidate the youth.
This bill would, however broaden the scope of facilities that could
be used in disposing of juvenile cases in a manner consistent with the
best interests of both the juvenile and society.
These bills could help to eliminate some of the problems inherent
within L.B. 620. However, the language used in at least two of these
bills could-if strictly interpreted-result in the deprivation of certain
rights that are extremely important to anyone charged with a criminal
offense. For example, L.B. 292 and L.B. 288 state that the rules of
evidence "shall" not be used in hearings to determine whether the
juvenile must remain in the custody of authorities after the court has
entered an order continuing detention and in hearings to decide on the
question of whether to transfer a case from district to juvenile court.
Both types of hearings are extremely important to the juvenile
offender. He or she-like any other defendant-should have the
protection of the rules of evidence at these proceedings. It is not

JUVENILES

425

made by L.B. 620 are interpreted in the future, the basic groundwork has been laid. It is now up to our judicial system to take
hold of this tool and use it to mold a more rational and just system
to prosecute the juvenile offender.
Thomas L. Hagel, '76
difficult to envision the damage that could be done by the admission
of blatantly hearsay testimony.
These laws will greatly affect the implementation and interpretation of LAB. 620. Therefore, their provisions should be studied
closely to determine their precise effect on the disposition of cases
involving juvenile offenders.

